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Abstract
This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require
the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal pol-
icy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period
model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding
that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent tar-
gets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss
function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central
bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent
policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss
function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent
with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot
serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss func-
tion for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In
addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution
design in a game-theoretical framework.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E42, E52, E58
We presented an earlier version at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
We thank Richard Dennis, Mark Spiegel, and Tao Wu for helpful comments and
assistance. Yuan and Miller (2006) present a second method for the making of
optimal and consistent policy. For convenience, we call the method in this paper,
the analytical approach, and the second method, the implementation approach.
1. Introduction 
The economic literature contains a strand that focuses on the optimality and consistency of 
decision making. Optimal plans lead inextricably to inconsistencies. An important part of this 
literature examines the optimality and consistency of microeconomic policy, 1  especially 
monetary policy.  
Kydland and Prescott (1977) launch this whole literature by arguing that optimal policy 
proves inconsistent and showing that the inconsistency results from rational expectations. In a 
simple model of monetary policy making, the central bank needs some commitment technique to 
achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Absent the commitment technique, optimal 
monetary policy proves time inconsistent. The Kydland and Prescott (1977) thesis focuses on 
intertemporal issues and the need for commitment. While most of their analysis considers an 
intertemporal model, they do explore the issues within a simple sequential-decision, one-period 
model. 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) build an analytical model for analyzing the inconsistency issue 
of monetary policy, by modifying a verbal and graphical model in Kydland and Prescott (1977).2 
Because of rational expectations, an inflation bias prevails under discretion (consistent policy), 
even though the optimal policy equals zero inflation. Barro and Gordon (1983b) prove that 
reputation can provide the commitment technique necessary to make consistent policy optimal, 
under certain conditions.  
Based on Barro and Gordon’s (1983a) standard monetary model, much of the literature 
                                                          
1 Since the macroeconomic model involves the firm’s and wage setter’s decisions, we refer to the macroeconomic 
model as microeconomic model throughout the paper. 
2 Barro and Gordon (1983a) modify the social objective function, making both the deviations of inflation and 
unemployment from target quadratic terms, whereas the implied model in Kydland and Prescott (1977) enters the 
deviation of unemployment from target as a linear, and not quadratic, term. But, the model in Barro and Gordon 
(1983b) encompasses the verbal and graphical monetary model in Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
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provides solutions to the inconsistency problem in monetary policy. Before considering our 
solution, we first review and define the concepts of optimal and consistent policies. Then, we 
compute optimal policy and consistent policy in a simple model, using control-theory and game-
theory solution techniques. By analyzing consistent policy and its outcome, we find that the 
source of inconsistency comes from inconsistent targets, an important observation in our method. 
That is, the two targets, the inflation rate and the employment level, in the social loss function 
prove inconsistent. As a result, the central bank should not adopt the social loss function as its 
own. Accordingly, we design the central bank loss function with consistent targets. Under the 
designed loss function, the optimal policy and consistent policy prove identical.  
We compare and contrast our method to the solutions in the existing literature and get 
some interesting results. In addition, we apply our method to several different variants of the 
Barro and Gordon (1983a) type model with the same outcome. Yuan and Miller (2005) apply 
this method to the specific inflation-unemployment example in Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the inconsistency of 
optimal plans. Section 3 develops the simple Barro and Gordon (1983a) type model and 
illustrates how consistent policy proves non-optimal. Section 4 discusses the design of the central 
bank loss function such that consistent policy proves optimal. Section 5 compares our solution to 
the inconsistency problem with other solutions in the existing literature. Section 6 repeats our 
method for a more complex, although still simple, model. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Optimal Policy and Consistent Policy: A Review 
Strotz (1955-56) first broached the subject of the inconsistency of optimal plans. Afterwards, 
much literature proves its existence, tries to determine its sources or causes, and provides its 
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solutions. To review this literature, we first clarify the concepts of optimal plans and consistent 
plans, making it easier to understand inconsistency of optimal plans. 
Definitions of Optimal Policy and Consistent Policy 
For optimal plans, the existing literature shares the same implicit definition, but uses different 
terms, for example, “commitment optimum path” (Pollak, 1968) and “Ramsey policy” (Chari, 
1988). An optimal plan, defined by Strotz (1955-56), implies that an individual chooses over 
some future period of time to maximize the utility of the plan, evaluated in the present. The 
individual’s choice, of course, conforms to certain constraints. Strotz’s definition applies to one-
person decision problems. In a game-theory model, especially a microeconomic model with a 
social planner (e.g., the government or the central bank), we define the optimal policy as the 
social planner’s ex ante plan, if implemented, that produces a Pareto efficient outcome, 
according to some social welfare criterion. 
Now, turn to a consistent plan. Strotz (1955-1956) defines a consistent plan as the best 
plan among those that an individual will actually follow. Pollak (1968) argues, however, that 
Strotz’s consistent plan, which corresponds to Pollak’s “naïve optimum path”, could not actually 
occur. Pollak defines another term “sophisticated optimum path,” the correct definition of a 
consistent plan. The sophisticated optimum path captures the same idea as subgame perfect 
equilibrium and/or sequential equilibrium in game-theory models, though Pollak’s model 
encompasses only a one-person decision problem. Kydland and Prescott (1977) define consistent 
policy much like Pollak’s “naïve optimum path.” Kydland (1977) suggests “operational 
characteristics of economics models…point strongly toward an equilibrium concept for dynamic 
dominant-player models… This solution is called the feedback solution… it has the property that 
the original plan is consistent under replanning.” Chari and Kehoe (1989) define time consistent 
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policy as a sustainable plan. Sustainability closely relates to subgame perfection and sequential 
equilibrium. In sum, in microeconomic models with more than one decision maker, we define a 
consistent policy as the government’s (or the central bank’s) plan, which, together with the 
strategies of other decision makers, constitutes an equilibrium. The equilibrium can include a 
Nash equilibrium, a subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), or a sequential equilibrium 
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982). At this point, we do not discuss, in detail, which equilibrium concept 
proves more adequate, because different equilibrium concepts correspond to different types of 
game-theory models. Also, the concept of equilibrium continuously evolves. Loosely speaking, 
an equilibrium contains a strategy profile that results in “an outcome that satisfies mutually 
consistent expectations.” (Shubik, 1998, p. 6) 
Existence and Sources of Inconsistency 
With clear definitions of optimal plans and consistent plans, we can now more easily grasp the 
nature of the inconsistency of optimal plans from perspective of game theory, where equilibria 
often prove Pareto inefficient. Now, given that optimal plans generally prove inconsistent, the 
literature studies the sources of inconsistency. For one-person decision problems, inconsistency 
may arise from an “intertemporal tussle” (Strotz, 1955-1956) and the specific functional form of 
utility.3 Thus, for example, Calvo (1978a), Rodriguez (1981), and Leininger (1985) show that 
consistent and optimal plans exist in an important class of economies with special functional 
forms for utility (e.g., stationary period or instantaneous utility). Other researchers, such as 
Dasgupta (1974), demonstrate that an inadequate social welfare criterion can lead to inconsistent 
optimal plans. In sum, inconsistency can occur for different specific reasons in different specific 
                                                          
3 Actually, the “intertemporal tussle” in Strotz (1955-1956) results from the non-exponential discount function, 
which also captures a specific functional form of utility. 
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models. This view, we argue also applies to more-than-one-person decision problems (i.e., game-
theory models).  
Kydland and Prescott (1977)  first perceived the inconsistency that resulted from rational 
expectations.4 Rational expectations imply the important notion of equilibrium in game theory. 
As defined above, an equilibrium outcome reflects rational players’ mutually consistent 
expectations. We argue that they correctly recognize the source of inconsistency of the optimal 
plan. Then Kydland and Prescott (1977) conclude, “there is no way control theory can be made 
applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.” (p. 473) But in Kydland and 
Prescott (1980), they also indicate, “Even though there is little hope of the optimal plan being 
implemented—because of its time inconsistency—we think the exercise is of more than 
pedagogical interest. The optimal plan’s return is a benchmark with which to compare the time 
consistent solution...” (p. 79) In other words, control theory can identify the optimal plan and, 
thus, the optimal economic outcomes. Then, we can seek a consistent plan that coincides with the 
optimal plan through institutional design. That is, the optimal plan can indicate how to design the 
optimal institution, through which we implement the optimal plan with a consistent plan. This 
task encompasses the rest of this paper and the other paper by Yuan and Miller (2006). 
Solutions to Inconsistency of Optimal Plan 
We classify the solutions to the inconsistency of optimal plans into three types: rules, reputation, 
and delegation. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue for “rules rather than discretion.” That is, rules can 
provide the commitment technique to achieve optimal policy. And the literature provides many 
illustrations that economies perform better under rules than under consistent policy (i.e., 
                                                          
4 Calvo (1978b) independently perceived this point. 
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discretion). As a result, a literature exists on the design of policy rules. In monetary models, they 
include McCallum (1988), Taylor (1993), Svensson (1999), and so on. Even if a central bank 
voluntarily adopts a rule, it still faces the commitment issue – time consistency. Delegation of a 
rule to the central bank can address this commitment issue. In our context, we delegate a loss 
function, not a rule, to the central bank. 
As we know, equilibria often prove Pareto inefficient (i.e., consistent policy generally 
proves not optimal). Game theory suggests, however, that an equilibrium outcome may prove 
optimal under certain conditions, if the game repeats and reputation plays a role. That is, 
reputation can provide a commitment technique to attain optimal policy in repeated games. Barro 
and Gordon (1983b) construct such a model to show that optimal policy proves implementable 
and consistent under certain conditions. Backus and Driffill (1985) demonstrate that reputation, 
based on the concept of Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequential equilibrium, makes optimal policy 
credible. We, however, do not advocate the reputation approach, which we explain below. 
In our context and in monetary models, delegation means that the government 
delegates a monetary policy objective to the central bank. In a broad sense, delegation implies 
mechanism or institutional design. When establishing a specific institution (e.g., the central 
bank), the government must delegate an appropriate objective. Rogoff (1985), Walsh (1995), 
Svensson (1997), Chortareas and Miller (2003), and so on fall broadly into the delegation 
approach. 
Rogoff (1985) suggests the appointment of a “conservative” central banker. That is, 
appoint someone who places a higher weight on reducing inflation than society. We note for later 
reference that this suggestion implies that the central banker use a loss function that differs from 
society. Rogoff’s conservative central banker cannot completely eliminate the inflation bias, 
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which prevails under consistent policy. That is, consistent policy still does not prove optimal 
under Rogoff’s conservative central banker. 
Svensson (1997) delegates an inflation target that differs from society’s target. Once 
again, the central banker possesses a loss function that differs from the social loss function. 
Svensson’s inflation target can completely eliminate the inflation bias, if we simplify Svensson’s 
model to the basic model without employment persistence. That is, consistent policy proves 
optimal under inflation targeting for the simplified model.  
Walsh (1995) introduces an incentive contract that penalizes the central banker for 
deviations from the target inflation rate. The proper choice of the penalization rate completely 
eliminates the inflation bias. Walsh implicitly assumes in his derivation that the government 
places no weight on the cost of the incentive contract. Chortareas and Miller (2002) show that if 
the government places some weight on the cost of the incentive contract that the contract cannot 
completely eliminate the inflationary bias. As an alternative to the inflation contract, Chortareas 
and Miller (2002) propose an output contract for the central banker that penalizes deviations of 
output from the natural rate. The proper choice of the penalty rate completely eliminates the 
inflation bias, even if the government cares about the cost of the contract. 
In sum, delegation solutions to the inconsistency problem adopt a central bank loss 
function that differs from society’s loss function. We develop a general method of institutional 
design or target delegation that causes consistent policy to prove optimal (i.e., Section 4). Then 
we compare our general solution to the other delegation solutions offered in the existing 
literature (i.e., Section 6). But, first, we construct a standard model where consistent policy 
proves non-optimal in the next section. 
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3. Optimal Policy and Consistent Policy in a Simple Model  
Barro and Gordon (1983a) introduce a basic model for analyzing the inconsistency issue in 
monetary policy. We adopt one-period model with complete information. Reasons follow.  
First, understanding our analytical method becomes less difficult in the simplest models. 
Thus, we attack the problem one piece at a time.  
Second, for a one-period game, the inconsistency of optimal plans generally exists, no 
matter whether players’ decisions occur simultaneously or sequentially.5 The prisoner’s dilemma 
provides an example of the simultaneous-decision, one-period game model. Before the game 
begins, both suspects know that their optimal strategy equals “confess;” their rational and 
consistent strategy equals “defect,” once the game starts. Other examples of sequential-decision, 
one-period games exist, where such inconsistency prevails.  
Third, some multi-period models in the literature basically reduce to one-period models 
for a stationary period function and a discount function of the form δ t, where 0 ≤δ ≤ 1 equals 
discount factor. Such models include the inflation-unemployment example in Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and the Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) model.  
Fourth, a repeated game creates other difficulties, making them greatly different from the 
one-period game. The Folk Theorem indicates that equilibrium outcomes of the game only 
require that each player’s payoff exceeds the player’s max-min payoff. No definite method 
predicts which equilibrium gets chosen, however. Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes in a 
repeated game may depend on psychology and culture. As a result, the equilibrium becomes 
                                                          
5 Kydland (1977, p313) already notes that even in the first period, the dominant player may deviate from the original 
policy, implying inconsistency even in the one-period game. He refers to the deviant policy as the closed-loop 
policy. A similar deviation occurs for open-loop policy—the optimal policy. 
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unreliable.6 But if we make optimal policy consistent in a one-period game, then in the repeated 
game, the equilibrium (consistent) policy always proves optimal.  
Fifth, we can consider a repeated game with incomplete information as a one-period 
game with complete information. As the game repeats, players adjust their beliefs in a Bayesian 
fashion and approach complete information as the game progresses. 
The Basic Model 
We begin with a standard version model of the microeconomy and a quadratic social loss 
function in terms of the inflation rate and employment.7 That is, 
(1)  22 )( ?? −+= χπL , 
where π equals the inflation rate, ℓ equals the logarithm of employment level, and ?  equals the 
logarithm of “full employment,” which we assume higher than the logarithm of the natural level, 
?~ . The social loss function implies that the society considers two targets – a zero inflation rate 
and “full employment.” The weight that society places on the inflation target relative to the 
employment target equals χ, the trade-off parameter. To simplify, we consider only a one-period 
social loss function, allowing us to omit the period subscript t. We also assume that the central 
bank directly control inflation rate, π. 
Now, we model the microeconomic structure with an expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve and rational expectations. That is, 
(2)  ue −−+= )(~ ππβ??  and 
(3)  , )(ππ Ee =
                                                          
6 But Barro and Gordon (1983b) show that reputation plays a role and indicate the conditions under which the 
consistent policy proves optimal. 
7 See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983a), Rogoff (1985), Flood and Isard (1989), Lohnman (1992), Walsh 
(1995), Persson and Tabellini (1993), Svensson (1997), and so on. 
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where β equals the responsiveness of employment to unexpected inflation, u equals an 
independently and identically distributed negative supply shock with mean 0 and variance σ 2, and 
π e equals the wage setter’s expectation of the inflation rate. 
The private sector’s behavioral equations (2) and (3), the firm (F) and the wage setter 
(WS), respectively, conform to the following logic. The wage setter and the firm sign a wage 
contract, where the wage setter sets the nominal wage, w, and the firm sets the labor amount, ℓ, 
that it hires. After signing the wage contract, a negative shock, u, may occur. Then the central 
bank (CB) implements its policy decision, π, minimizing the social loss function. Since the 
contract fixes the nominal wage, the wage setter must form a rational expectation of the inflation 
rate before setting the wage rate, contingent on that inflation forecast (i.e., the wage setter uses 
behavioral equation 3). Finally, given the firm’s decision, a certain employment level emerges 
from the firm’s behavioral equation (2). The timing of the sequential decisions in this one-period 
model unfolds according to the following chart:8
 
π e or 
w u 
π or
p 
( )   o
( )
e u
w p u
β π π
β
= + − −
= − − −
?? ?
?? ?
r
CB   F Shock WS 
 
 
Further, we assume that the participants in the economy (i.e., central bank, wage setter, 
and firm) view the model as common knowledge (i.e., the social loss function and the two 
behavioral equations of the private sector). 
For the convenience of extending the standard model below, we transform the model as 
follows, without changing any essence of the model. We replace π with p−p0, because our model 
                                                          
8 We will shortly modify the model and replace the inflation rate with the change in the price level from its starting 
value and the expected inflation rate with the nominal wage rate. That is, the wage setter will attempt to keep the 
real wage rate constant on an expected basis. 
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is a one-period game. Thus,  
(4)  ( )0 0 lnP P P d P dp p pπ = − = = = − 0 , 
where P and p equal the price level and its natural logarithm, respectively, and the subscript zero 
indicates their starting values. In addition, ( )2pwLWS −=  equals the loss function of the wage 
setter, who intends to hold the real wage level constant. Because the supply shock happens after 
the signing of the wage contract, the wage setter must form a rational expectation of the inflation 
rate and accordingly must set an optimal nominal wage to minimize the expected loss ( )WSLE . 
The modified model becomes the following: 
(5)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
0
2
min
( )
. .
min
p
WSw
L p p
w p u
s t
E L E w p
χ
β
= − + −
⎧ = − − −⎪⎨ ⎡ ⎤= −⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
? ?
?? ? . 
Now we compute this model’s optimal policy and consistent policy with control-theory 
and game-theory solution techniques. 
Optimal Policy 
As stated above, control theory can provide a useful benchmark. With control theory, we 
determine the optimal plan and, thus, the optimal economic outcome. This provides a benchmark 
for policy making. The benchmark case assumes complete information and decisions made by 
one person before the game starts. That is, we assume that the optimal policy is an ex ante plan 
made by a social planner with complete information. The optimal policy and outcome for model 
(5) reduce to the following results:9
(6)  0 2p p u
β
χ β= + +  and 
                                                          
9 See Appendix A for the derivation. 
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(7)  ( ) 2 22E L kχ σχ β= ++ . 
Consistent Policy 
Using backward induction to solve the problem expressed in model (5), we first must solve for 
the central bank’s optimal decision for the price level. That is, given the nominal wage and the 
supply shock, the central bank chooses the p to minimize the social loss function, yielding the 
following relationship: 
(8)  
2
02 2 2 2p p w k
χ β β β
χ β χ β χ β χ β= + + ++ + + + u , 
where k ≡ − ?? ?  equals the employment bias.  
With the central bank’s reaction function in equation (8), the wage setter’s expected loss 
equals the following relationship: 
(9)  ( ) ( )
2 2
2
02 2WSE L w p k
χ β β
2 σχ β χ β χ β
⎡ ⎤ ⎛= − − + ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ + +⎣ ⎦ ⎝
⎞
⎠ . 
Therefore, the equilibrium nominal wage equals10
(10)  0w p k
β
χ= + . 
Substituting equation (10) into equation (8) yields the equilibrium price level as follows: 
(11)  0 2p p k u
β β
χ χ β= + + + . 
As observed in the standard literature, there exists an inflationary bias, ( )0E p p kβχ− = . 
With the equilibrium nominal wage and price level, we get the equilibrium employment 
                                                          
10 We obtain equation (8) by setting ( ) 0WSdE L dw = . 
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(12)  u2
~
βχ
χ
+−= ?? , 
which leads to the expected social loss as follows: 
(13)  ( ) 22 22 1E L kχ βσχ β χ
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
. 
Compared with the optimal policy and outcomes in equations (6) and (7), the consistent 
policy and outcomes generate the inflationary bias (i.e., a higher price level than the initial one) 
in equation (11) and a larger social loss in equation (13). 
Two important points deserve comment. First, the two targets in the social loss function, 
0  and p ? , actually conflict with each other, given the microeconomic structure in equations (2) 
and (3). If the central bank wants to achieve full employment, it must inflate the economy, 
meaning that the central bank cannot achieve the zero inflation-rate target. If the central bank, on 
the other hand, wants to hit the zero inflation-rate target, then it cannot raise the employment 
level above the natural level. So the two targets, 0 and p ? , prove incompatible. Does it make 
sense to delegate incompatible targets to the central bank? No. Then how can we define 
compatible targets for the central bank? We assume that compatible targets, , exist. 
Such compatible targets must conform to the structure of the microeconomic model that 
underlies the central bank optimization problem. The next section formalizes how we specify an 
optimization scheme that delegates compatible or consistent targets to the central bank, with 
which the central bank optimizes the social loss function. We cannot ignore the microeconomic 
model of the economy when we stipulate or delegate the two economic targets for the central 
bank.  
*  and p ?*
Second, we observe that the employment target, ? , proves overambitious and 
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unattainable under the assumptions of the microeconomic model because 
(14)  ( ) [ ] [ ]( ) ( )E E w p u w E p E uβ β⎡ ⎤= − − − = − − − =⎣ ⎦? ?? ? ? ?? , 
which means that the level of employment can only equal the natural level, on average. 
According to equations (11) and (12), we also know that 
(15)  
( )
( )
0 0 and E p p k p
E
β
χ= + ≠
= ≠?? ? ?
. 
The above inequalities mean that, on average, the central bank cannot achieve each of its targets, 
which seems illogical. Society should not delegate such targets to the central bank. A more 
sensible approach makes the following assumptions about delegating targets to the central bank 
(16)  ( ) ( )* * and p E p E= =? ? . 
That is, proper targets should allow the central bank to achieve them. We call such targets 
consistent targets. The assumptions in equation (16) prove essential for determining optimal and 
consistent monetary policy in Section 4. Actually, the assumptions in (16) hold when choosing 
parameters, , to minimize the central bank loss function.*  and p ?*
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In sum, the central bank should not adopt or get delegated the social loss function as its 
own.  
4. Central Bank Loss Function Design 
The analysis of the prior section leads to two fundamental conclusions about why the monetary 
policy action leads to an inflationary bias. First, the targets of monetary policy identified in the 
social loss function prove inconsistent with each other in the context of the microeconomic 
model. Second, the central bank uses the social loss function as its own loss function with the 
11 See equations (36) and (37). 
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inconsistent targets. 
Our method requires that the central bank appointed possesses a loss function, or gets 
delegated a loss function, that differs from the social loss function in that the targets of policy 
used by the central bank prove consistent with the microeconomic model. Ample precedent 
exists for the use of a central bank loss function that differs from the social loss function – 
Rogoff (1985), Svensson (1997), Walsh (1995), Chortareas and Miller (2003), and so on. These 
authors, however, do not consider the most important lesson from our prior analysis, delegating 
consistent targets for the central bank.  
Consider the social loss function in equation (1). Society possesses two targets – a zero 
inflation rate, p0, and full employment, ? , as well as the relative weight that the society places on 
the two targets, χ. That is, three important parameters exist -- 0,  , and pχ ?  -- in the social loss 
function. Similarly, we assume that these same three parameters, possibly with different values, 
enter the central bank’s loss function, denoted respectively as . That is, we assume 
the following central bank loss function: 
* * *, , and pχ ?
(17)  . ( ) ( 2*2** ?? −+−= ppLCB χ )
In the first stage, the central bank sets the price level, p, in the loss function (17), subject to 
the constraint of the microeconomic model as follows: 
(18)  upw −−−= )(~ β?? ,  and 
(19)  ( ) ( )[ ]2min pwELE WSw −= . 
Given the solution to the first-stage problem, the second stage requires that the chosen 
 minimize the expected social loss. That is, the appointed central banker possesses 
that precise loss function that includes these parameter values or the central bank gets delegated 
***  and , ?pχ
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these parameter values for its loss function. Therefore, the central bank optimizes with the 
following model: 
(20)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
* * *
22
0, ,
2* * * 2
2
min
min ( )
. . ( )
. .
min
p
CBp
WSw
E L E p p
L p p
s t w p u
s t
E L E w p
χ
χ
χ
β
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − + −⎪⎪ ⎧ = − − −⎨ ⎪⎪ ⎨ ⎡ ⎤= −⎪ ⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩⎩
?
? ?
? ?
?? ?
 . 
The model’s solution involves two steps. First, solve the following partial model: 
(21)  . 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−=
−−−=
−+−=
2
2*2**
min
)(~
..
)(min
pwELE
upw
ts
ppL
WSw
CBp
β
χ
??
??
The solution process of this partial model exactly mirrors the solution in Section 3, producing the 
following results: 
(22)  ( )?? ~*** −+= χβpw , 
(23)  ( ) upp 2**** ~ βχ βχβ ++−+= ?? , 
(24)  u2*
*~
βχ
χ
+−= ??  and 
(25)  , ( ) (I) (II)E L EL EL= +
where 
22 *
2
* 2 * 2(I)EL
β χχ σχ β χ β
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 and ( ) 2* * 0*(II) 2EL p pβχ χ⎡ k⎤= + − − +⎢⎣ ⎦?? ? ⎥  equals the 
expected social losses, related and unrelated to the shock. Notice that we calculate the expected 
social loss E(L), not the central bank loss LCB. The central bank, now, must minimize the 
expected social loss. Minimizing the central bank’s loss function in the first step only aids in 
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minimizing the social loss in the second step. When the central bank minimizes its loss function 
(equation 17), the expected social loss equals the expression in equation (25), which we desire to 
minimize in the second step. 
Second, we select  to minimize the expected social loss in equation (25). 
Consider EL(II). Absent a shock, the relative importance between inflation target and 
employment target, , does not matter. Rather, we minimize the expected social loss, given no 
shock, when 
* * *, , and pχ ?
*χ
( )* * 0* 0p pβχ+ − −?? ? = . If a shock occurs, what happens to ? Solving the 
simultaneous equations generated by the first order conditions as follows: 
*χ
(26)  
( )
( )
( )
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
=∂
∂
=∂
∂
=∂
∂
0
0
0
*
*
*
?
LE
p
LE
LE
χ
, 
we obtain 
(27)     and  χχ =*
(28)  ( ) 0** ~ pp =−+ ??χβ . 
The condition that  means that to minimize the effect of supply shock, the central 
bank’s optimal preference  between inflation target and employment target should equal that 
of society. This result contradicts Rogoff’s (1985) proposed solution to the inflationary bias of 
appointing a conservative central banker, whereby (
χχ =*
*χ
*χ χ> ). 
We can also prove that χ * must equal χ by apagoge. If χ * >χ, that is, the central banker 
places more importance on inflation target than does society, then the central banker will under-
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inflate when observing a large negative shock. Thus, the employment level, which falls 
significantly due to the large negative shock, cannot reach the level that society desires. 
Therefore, social welfare falls because of the central bank’s conservatism when a large negative 
shock occurs. In contrast, if χ * < χ, that is, the central banker places more importance on the 
employment target than does society, then the central banker will over-inflate when facing a 
small negative shock to raise the employment level. This also reduces social welfare because the 
central bank over reacts to a small negative shock. Because society cannot forecast whether the 
shock will occur and how large the shock is, society should stipulate an identical preference 
parameter χ * for the central bank as that of society, χ. 
In sum, the conservative central banker approach does not directly attack the cause of the 
inconsistency in monetary policy. If Rogoff’s approach could solve the inconsistency in 
monetary policy, then that inconsistency resulted from a larger weight on the employment target 
relative to the inflation target (i.e., a smaller weight on the inflation target). Much literature (e.g., 
Lohnmann 1992, Svensson 1997, Blinder 1998, Chortareas and Miller 2003, and so on), however, 
argues that the inconsistency in monetary policy reflects an over ambitious employment target. 
Therefore, the inappropriate employment target itself causes the inconsistency, not the larger 
weight on the employment target. 
In addition, our result coincides with and receives support from McCallum’s (1997) 
following argument about society’s and central banker’s preferences and the relative weight 
attached to the inflation versus employment deviations from target: 
“A related disagreement with the standard literature involves the notion that 
it is useful to conduct analysis, involving institutional design, under the 
presumption that central banks can have preferences that are systematically 
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different from the society’s. This might occasionally be the case in some 
nations, but on average I would expect that the relative importance given to 
inflation and unemployment avoidance will be approximately the same by a 
central bank and the society of which it is a part. In democracies, central 
banks will tend to be aware of and reflect the preferences of the population. 
That tendency might be discouraged in various ways, but I would expect that 
(for example) attempts to appoint governors with tastes more anti-
inflationary than society’s would often result in ex post surprises about these 
tastes. And I would expect legislation to be overturned fairly promptly if it 
were truly inconsistent with the preferences of the nation’s population. In any 
event, it would seem to be asking for trouble if institutions were designed 
under the presumption that CB preferences differ from those of the public at 
large.” (p. 107) 
Equation (28) shows that the two targets of the central bank specifically relate to each 
other. When we stipulate the targets for the two economic variables ( ), we should not 
ignore the microeconomic model that implicitly links the two. Equation (28) identifies how the 
two targets must relate to each other.  
and p ?
Using equations (27) and (28) causes equations (22), (23), (24), and (25) to reduce to 
the following equations: 
(29)  , 0w p=
(30)  0 2p p u
β
χ β= + + ,  
(31)  u2
~
βχ
χ
+−= ?? , and 
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(32)  ( ) 2 22E L kχ σχ β= ++ . 
Notice that consistent policy and the resulting outcome contained, respectively, in 
equations (30) and (32), under the loss function (17) whose parameters satisfy equations (27) and 
(28), prove optimal, as shown in equations (6) and (7). 
Equation (28), however, allows an infinite set of price and employment targets that 
optimize the social welfare function. Can we reduce the degree of uncertainty and pin down 
precise values? We need another condition. We noted above that it seems illogical to delegate to 
the central bank targets that it cannot expect to achieve. Rather, the assumptions contained in 
equation (16) specify the rules that choose targets that the central bank can achieve. In the 
present context, that means the following: 
(33)  * 0( )p E p p= =  and  
(34)  . * ( )E= = ?? ? ?
* = ?Moreover,  together satisfy the target-relationship contained in equation (28).  * 0  and p p= ??
For the present problem, equations (33) and (34) define consistent targets. Consistent 
targets exist if, and only if, they satisfy target-relationship equation (28) and the assumptions 
contained in equation (16). That is, consistent targets should prove compatible with each other, 
and should not prove too ambitious or too modest. Moreover, they should prove attainable by the 
central bank. 
Viewing the problem somewhat differently, but leading to the same conclusion, 
consistent targets optimize the central bank welfare function. To see this, consider the value of 
the central bank loss function, given the solutions to the minimization of the social loss function. 
Note that the only ambiguity relates to the values of the target price and employment levels. That 
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is, equation (27) indicates that the weight associated with the inflation term in the social loss 
function equals the weight in the central bank loss function. Thus, we need to choose the target 
price and employment levels to minimize the following central bank loss function: 
(35)  
* *
2 2
~
* *
0 2 2,
~
* 2 * 2 2
0 2
min ,
( ) ( ) .
CBp
EL E p u p u
p p
β χχ χ β χ β
χχ σχ β
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥= + − + − −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫= − + − + ⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭
?
? ?
? ?
⎞⎟⎠  
This minimization problem produces the following solutions: 
(36)  * 0p p=  and  
(37)  . * = ?? ?
Thus, consistent targets also minimize the central banks loss function as well as the social loss 
function. The central bank’s minimum loss equals the following: 
(38)  22 .CBEL
χ σχ β
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭  
In sum, given the social loss function and the microeconomic equations contained in 
model (5), the central bank’s loss function, which helps to optimize the social welfare and which 
uses consistent targets, equals the following: 
(39)  . ( ) ( )220CBL p pχ= − + − ?? ?
Under the central bank’s loss function (equation 39), the consistent policy and outcome, 
contained in equations (30) and (32) prove optimal, as shown in equations (6) and (7).  
5. Compare and Contrast to the Existing Literature 
As noted above, Rogoff (1985), Svensson (1997), Walsh (1995), and Chortareas and Miller 
(2002) each address the inherent inflation bias in the basic Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) model, 
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offering different solutions. This section compares our findings with an optimal objective 
function and consistent targets. 
Rogoff’s (1985) solution proves inconsistent with our findings. That is, he alters the 
central bank objective function by appointing a conservative central banker. Within the context 
of the model used above, he did not adopt consistent targets. Moreover, he also did not adopt an 
optimal central bank objective function. Our findings for optimal monetary policy require that 
equations (27) and (28) hold. Rogoff (1985) appoints a central banker for whom the trade-off 
coefficient between price and employment stability exceeds that for society. We find that the 
trade-off coefficient should not change. Moreover, Rogoff (1985) maintains Barro and Gordon’s 
target values for the price and employment levels, which prove inconsistent in our framework. 
Svensson’s (1997) solution does adopt an optimal central bank objective function, but he 
chooses price and employment level targets that prove inconsistent. His loss function takes the 
following form in our context: 
(40)  ( ) ( ) ( )2 2*0SvenssonCBL p pχ π⎡ ⎤= − − + −⎣ ⎦ ? ? , 
where π* equals the inflation target. Svensson (1997) determined that the optimal inflation target π* 
equals kβχ− . Interestingly, his targets 
*
0  and p p k
*β
χ= − ? = ?  satisfy the optimal target 
relationship identified in equation (28), but ( )*p E p≠  and ( )* E≠? ? , which means that he uses 
inconsistent targets. 
By using * kβπ χ= − , we can transform equation (40) as follows: 
(41)  ( ) ( )2 2 0Svensson 1 2 2CB CBL L k k w pβ βχ ku
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= + + + − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, 
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where LCB equals the optimal central bank loss function in equation (39). 
Walsh (1995) introduces a central banker inflation contract, which penalizes the central 
banker for producing an inflation rate different from its target value. His central bank loss 
function takes on the following form in our context: 
(42)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )220 0Walsh 2CBL p p fχ= − + − + −? ? p p , 
where f measures the penalty (fine) imposed on the magnitude once the central bank deviation 
from the zero inflation rate target. Walsh determined that the optimal penalty, f, equals kβ . 
Substituting f kβ=  into equation (42) and transforming the result produces the following: 
(43)  ( ) ( )2 0Walsh 2 2CB CBL L k k w pβ⎡ ⎤= + + − +⎣ ⎦ku , 
where LCB equals the optimal central bank loss function in equation (39). 
Chortareas and Miller (2002, C&M) consider a central banker employment contract, 
which penalizes the central banker for producing and employment level different from its target 
value. Their central bank loss function takes on the following form in our context: 
(44)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )220C&MCBL p pχ ξ⎡ ⎤= − + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦? ? tr
)
,12
where  equals the incentive scheme, t(0tr t t= − − ?? ? 0 equals a fixed payment, t equals the 
marginal penalization rate, and ξ equals the weight that the central banker attaches to the 
incentive scheme. Chortareas and Miller (2002) determine that the optimal incentive scheme 
takes the form: 
(45)  ( ) ( )0 2tr t kξ= − − ?? ? . 
                                                          
12 In fact, Chortareas and Miller (2002) use a utility function where the incentive scheme enters with a positive sign 
and the loss function enters with a negative sign. We multiply by minus one to convert into the loss function used in 
our work. 
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Substituting equation (45) into equation (44) and transforming the result produces the 
following: 
(46)  , ( ) ( )20C&MCB CBL L tξ= − − k
where, once again, LCB equals the optimal central bank loss function in equation (39). 
Excluding Rogoff (1985), we see that the modified central bank loss functions all contain 
our optimal central bank loss function plus some additional terms. But these additional terms do 
not depend on the price level. Thus,  
(47)  ( ) ( ) ( )Walsh Svensson C&MCB CB CB CBL L L L
p p p
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ ∂ p= ∂ . 
Therefore, when implementing consistent policy, the equilibrium outcomes prove identical under 
the four loss functions -- ( ) ( ) ( )Walsh , Svensson , C&M  and CB CB CB CBL L L L . In that sense, we can 
consider the four loss functions as equivalents. That is, 
(48)  ( ) ( ) ( )Walsh Svensson C&MCB CB CB CBL L L≅ ≅ L≅ . 
6. An Alternative Microeconomic Model 
Our analysis so far relies on the microeconomic equations contained in model (5). We modify 
the wage setter’s loss function to include a preference for a higher real wage rate as well as 
higher employment than that natural rate. We leave the term contained in the original wage 
setter’s loss function in model (5) so that we can derive the solution from that original model as a 
special case of this extended model. That is, setting the two parameters of the wage setter’s loss 
function equal to zero produces the results of the system contained in model (5). Moreover, 
setting one of the two parameters equal to zero, but not the other parameter generates the results 
from two additional special cases – wage setter wants a higher real wage or wage setter wants 
higher employment than the natural rate. The model structure generates the following problem: 
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(49)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
0
_
2 2
min
( )
. .
min 2 ( ) ( )
p
WSw
E L E p p
w p u
s t
E L E w p w p
χ
β
γ λ
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − − −⎪ ⎡ ⎤⎨ = − − + − + −⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
? ?
?? ?
? ?
. 
Its optimal policy and outcome equal the following:13
(50)  0 2p p u
β
χ β= + + , and 
(51)  ( ) 222 2( )(1 )
kE L 2
χ βγσχ β λβ
+= ++ + . 
Applying our method (i.e., Section 4) to the alternative model leads to the following 
problem: 
(52)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
* * *
22
0
, ,
2* * * 2
_2 2
min
min ( )
( ). .
. .
min 2 ( ) ( )
p
CBp
WSw
E L E p p
L p p
w p us t
s t
E L E w p w p
χ
χ
χ
β
γ λ
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − + −⎪⎪⎪ ⎧ = − − −⎨ ⎪⎪ ⎨ ⎡ ⎤= − − + − + −⎪ ⎪ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎩⎩
?
? ?
? ?
?? ?
? ?
. 
Carrying out the first optimization problem of the central bank and the wage setter 
generates the following results that correspond to equations (22), (23), and (24): 
(53)  ( )* ** 2( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )k kw p 2β β γ λβ γ λβχ λβ λβ⎡ ⎤− −= + − + +⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦?? ? , 
(54)  ( )* ** 2( )(1 )k * 2p p uβ β γ λβ βχ λβ χ⎡ ⎤−= + − + +⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦?? ? β , and 
(55)  
*
2 * 2
( )
(1 )
k uβ γ λβ χλβ χ β
−= − −+ +
?? ? . 
                                                          
13 See Appendix B for the derivation. 
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Note that if γ and λ equal zero, equations (53), (54), and (55) reduce to equations (22), 
(23), and (24). Further, if only γ equals zero, then employment exceeds the natural rate and if 
only λ equals zero, then employment falls below the natural rate. 
Now, to carry out the second optimization, we choose the starred values of the price and 
employment levels and the trade-off parameter to maximize the social welfare function, yielding 
the following results that correspond to equations (27) and (28): 
(56)       and  χχ =*
(57)  ( )* * 02( )(1 )kp pβ β γ λβχ λβ⎡ ⎤−+ − + =⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦?? ? . 
Once again, if γ and λ equal zero, equations (56) and (57) reduce to equations (27) and (28). 
Substituting equations (56) and (57) into equations (53), (54), and (55) generates the 
following solutions: 
(58)  0 2
( )
(1 )
kw p γ λβλβ
−= + + , 
(59)  0 2p p u
β
χ β= + + , and 
(60)  2 2
( )
(1 )
k uβ γ λβ χλβ χ β
−= − −+ +
?? ? . 
Thus, the real wage will rise (fall) and the employment level will fall below (rise above) the 
natural rate when γ > λβk (γ < λβk), ignoring the shock. 
Substituting the solutions for the price and employment levels into the social welfare 
function generates the following social loss: 
(61)  ( ) 222 2( )(1 )
kE L 2
χ βγσχ β λβ
+= ++ + . 
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Now, equation (57) permits an infinite number of combinations of the target price and 
employment levels. Applying the concept of consistent targets or choosing the target price and 
employment levels to minimize the central bank loss function yields the following results: 
(62)  * 0( )p E p p= =   and  
(63)  * 2
( )( )
(1 )
kE β γ λβλβ
−= = − +
?? ? ? .14
Therefore, the optimal central bank loss function equals the following: 
(64)  ( )
2
2
0 2
( )
(1 )CB
kL p p β γ λβχ λβ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤−= − + − −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
?? ? . 
Under this central bank loss function, the consistent policy and outcome, contained in equations 
(59) and (61), prove identical to the optimal policy and outcome, shown in equations (50) and (51). 
7. Conclusion 
Since the work of Strotz (1955-1956), economists continue to struggle with the 
consistency of optimal plans. Kydland and Prescott (1977) link the problem to the time 
consistency of optimal economic policy, showing that consistent policy proves non-optimal, in a 
game framework. Much work focuses on the simple one-period, game-theory problem developed 
by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). Within that model, an inflationary bias exists, since consistent 
policy proves non-optimal. 
Our paper develops a general method for making consistent policy, optimal, in simple 
models. We adopt institutional design or central bank delegation to solve the inconsistency 
problem. That is, we propose appointing a central banker who possesses consistent targets or 
delegate consistent targets to the central banker to make consistent policy optimal. 
                                                          
14 These two target values also minimize the central bank’s loss function. 
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The control-theory solution provides the benchmark optimal policy with which we 
evaluate the consistent policy emerging from our delegated (designed) central bank loss function. 
Carefully designing the central bank’s loss function can make optimal policy and consistent 
policy identical. This desirable result requires an understanding the two following points. First, 
the determination of the social loss function reflects a normative process. The social loss 
function only provides a criterion for designing a public institution, not the direct loss function 
for this specific institution.15 Second, the microeconomic structure proves key to determining the 
central bank loss function. That is, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on 
the structure of the microeconomy. 
What moral can we draw from our story? If the social welfare criterion incorporates 
inconsistent targets, then the central bank improves social welfare by adopting a different welfare 
criterion with consistent targets, a second-best solution. That is, even though the central bank’s 
performance depends on the target-inconsistent social welfare criterion, it can improve its 
performance by employing a target-consistent welfare function. Finally, if the central bank’s 
performance depends on its own target-consistent welfare function, it can further improve its 
performance. That is, the best outcome occurs if society replaces its target-inconsistent welfare 
function with a target-consistent welfare function, the first-best solution. The third-best solution 
occurs when the central bank uses toe target-inconsistent welfare criterion as its own. 
In sum, the correct central bank loss function depends on two factors -- the social welfare 
criterion and the structure of the microeconomy. Future research should focus on the following. 
First, consider our method with alternative normative social welfare criteria and with alternative 
                                                          
15 A popular view takes optimizing the representative household’s utility as the social welfare criterion. This view, 
however, does not permit differences between private and social interests.  Social welfare criteria can also capture 
the ideas of Rawls’ maximin criterion (Rawls, 1971), the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function (Pollak, 1979), 
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microeconomic structures. Second, and more important, evaluate our method within a dynamic 
model, since economic variables generally prove persistent. 
Appendix A: 
For the two-stage stochastic optimization problem associated with model (5), the first stage 
obtains the optimal value of deterministic variable, w, under certainty.16 That is, solving the 
following model 
(A-1)  
( ) ( )220,min
( ). .
w p
L p p
w ps t
w p
χ
β
= − + −
⎧ = − −⎨ =⎩
? ?
?? ? , 
with the constraint, w , coming from the first-order condition of the wage-setter’s loss 
function, we find that 
p=
(A-2)  . 
~
0w p p and= = =? ?
The second-stage adjusts the price level, p, after the first-stage optimal value under 
certainty, when a shock, u, occurs. Because the loss function equals a quadratic form with linear 
constraints, the augmentation of p must include a term linear in u. Thus, 
(A-3)  0p p au= + ; and 
the second-stage problem equals the following: 
(A-4)  
( ) ( )
( )
22
0 0
0
0
min
. .
a
EL E p au p
w p au u
s t
w p
χ
β
⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − − + −⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎨ =⎪⎩
? ?
?? ? , 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
or Arrow’s social welfare function (Arrow 1951), and so on. Thus, we argue that constructing the social welfare 
criterion reflects a normative problem in philosophy. 
16 See Kolbin (1977) and Marti (2005) for the two-stage solution technique with a stochastic optimization. In sum, 
the approach solves the optimization under certainty and then incorporates the random shock in the second stage as 
done in Appendix A and B. 
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which generates 2a
β
χ β= + . That is, the optimal policy equals equation (6). 
Appendix B: 
For the two-stage stochastic optimization problem associated with model (49), the first-stage 
obtains the optimal value of deterministic variable, w, under certainty. That is, solving the follow 
model 
(B-1)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
0,
min
( )
. .
0
w p
E L E p p
w p
s t
w p
χ
β
γ λβ
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − −⎪⎨− + − − − =⎪⎩
? ?
?? ?
? ?
, 
with the constraint, ( ) ( ) 0w pγ λβ− + − − − =? ? , coming from the first-order condition of the 
wage-setter’s loss function, we find that 
(B-2)  0 02 2
( ) ( ), ,  and 
(1 ) (1 )
k kw p p pγ λβ β γ λβλβ λβ
− −= + = = −+ +
?? ? . 
The second-stage adjusts the price level, p, after the first-stage optimal value under 
certainty, when a shock, u, occurs. Similarly, the augmentation of p must include a linear term in 
u as follows:  
(B-3)  0p p bu= + ; and 
now, the second-stage problem equals the following: 
(B-3)  
( ) ( )
( )
22
0 0
0
0 2
min
. . ( )
(1 )
b
EL E p bu p
w p bu u
s t kw p
χ
β
γ λβ
λβ
⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎧ = − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎪⎨ −= +⎪ +⎩
? ?
?? ? , 
which generates 2b
β
χ β= + . That is, the optimal policy equals equation (50). 
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